USSR Review Bj
After Afghanistan: Soviet Relations With the Smaller States of South Asia fj
USSR hat recentlyampaigniu relations wilh ibe mall states ofwhich had been relatively ignored bypolicy in th* past. Visits io Moscow byministers end beads of Mile ofand Sri Lanka mayhe Sovietsnew proposals for Improved trade. loans,projecu and have even made tomegrant aid. Soviet officials have stated their desireilea io the small nates
Ntw Opp&rlmmilies
Although certainly not atypical of current Soviet diplomatic strategy, these gesture* are builtarge eatent on the opportunities crealcd by specificevents- By far the most important of these hai been the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, compkied on IShe Soviet invasionevere obstacle lo the USSR's relation* with tbe smalt states of South Asia, because it demonstrated an apparent disregard on Moscows part for the sovereignty of weaker neighbors, while tlmuluneoutly introducing Soviet ground forces directly into ihc region. The occupation of Afghanistan also hurt Soviet efforts by antagonizing ihe United Suiei and the Pecos's Republic of China, traditionalof the small South Asian nates The decision to diicngagc from Afghanistan and the USSR'sof the Geneva Accords removed these stum-blingbtocks, while presenting Soviet diplomats in South Asia with something they could cite as proof thai Gorbachev's "new thinking" is more thanublic relations campaign.H
The death of Pakistani President Zia in8 and the subsequent democratization that brought Benaiir Bhutto to power complemented the Soviet withdrawal by leadinghaw in Indo-PakUtani
rack. -Kb
Btmn ind ihrslrncx twatUtitni cdfvied" I" ihi*
and Soviel-Pakistani relations. As India'sfoe. Pakistan hat been historically viewed by ibc smaller states of the regionounterweight to India, and, on many issues of regional importance. Pakistan hai championed the cause of the other South Asian oa irons
Finally, the decline in US aid to Bangladesh. Nepal, and Sri Lanka has contributed to ibe perceptionomewhat diminished US pretence in the"
ine prevailir .rr-ression in Sojth Ana it tnai Ibc Uniied Slates wil lose interest in the region is its attention towanes in the aftermath of the Soviet troop withdrawal^
Old Obitifles
In taking advantage of these opportuniltci forrelations with Bangladesh. Nepal, and Sri Lanka, tbe Sovietsumber of longstanding obitades. By far the most important of these is (he Indo-Soviet "specialndia is perceived is ihe great external threat by every other nation in Ihe region. Feir of India and iu aspirations to regional hegemony figure significantly in ill foreign policy coosrderilions in Dhaka. Kathmandu. andIndia's continuing arms buildup (it now fields the'largest military in the world) makes iu liny neighboring countries very unccenfortabk. aod ill military intervention in the Maldives and Srieven though byfueled amiety over Indian in lent root. Thit uneasineu Is only exacerbated by the security treaties India has signed with each of these states, some of which reserve to New Delhi Ihe right to intervene in the event of internal unrest. New Delhi repporu opposition panics within each of these nations andaseumber of South Asian Insurgencies.
To (he tnuiicr Soulh Asian couniries. New Delhi and Moscow are nearly synonymous because ofIndo-Sovlei trade connections, Sovieiaid. and arms sales. Soviet-Indian collusiontaple of the press in these states. South Asians note Soviet support for Indian actions in the Maldives and Sri Lanka and corresponding Indian support for the Soviet-backed rejime in Afghanistan"*:
The same holds true In other areas of contact.eichanges with Mcacow draw link enthusiasm from Bangladesh. Nepal, and Sri Lanka, andto study in the USSR are viewed as only belter than no schooling at all. Degrcca from Soviet schools are not considered attractive or even adequate by many potential emptoyen. and graduates of Sonet pfogrim* have lilt hi or no Impact In their native
itself attempts to limit Soviet involvement in th* region New Delhi jealously scrutinizes Sovietin South Asia to ensure that the USSR it not attempting to undermine India's regional leadership and carvephere of influence distinct from thai of India. The combination of ihcw (wodistrust of the small states because of the Indian "nisi" aid (he un-tllingness of Indialay too great athe foremost obstacle to significant improvement of the Soviei position.
The eitreme poverty of the region dictates that economics willritical factor in any expanded relationship between (be USSR and ihe smalt South Asian states. This could be an opportunity for the USSR to attemptill (he gap being left byAmerican aid to the region. However, the Soviets have indicated that their own economic restructuring it their first priority, aod Foreignas called for Soviet foreign policy to be cost effective. Thus it is unlikely (hat the Soviets would be wilting lo divert significant financial resources to entice ihese countries Moreover. Dhaka. Colombo, and Kathmandii will take whai they can get, bul they regard Moscow'i technology ai outdated. It* methods as impractical, and Its aid as having too many strings attached. Even in the area of military sales, growth is unlikely. Sovietaintenance arc con-Wdered inferior to those of the West, and India has ofien managed to block arms tales to lis smaller neighbors.
Another obstacle to improved relations is tbeperception of Soviet meddling in theirSizable Communist panics wi(hties to Moscow can be found in each,long histories of hostile opposition lo theThe USSR dlsieminates propaganda andthrough its assets in ihe local presscirclet Moreover, each country has aof Scvk. ii.Uiin uomeitic
a Soviei military iitache in Nepal who never presented his credentials lo (he Nepaleieto disaffected Bangladeshis receivingtraining in the USSR
In general, (he arearonounced preference for Ih* United States and the West. Many local elites were educated or have lived in the Wesl. The Sovietsften conducted ibemiclvti couricouilyibem. For
my.
are frustrated and intuited by the patronizing altitude of the Sovieis who. ihey claim, are interested only in telling the Nepales* what they need and bow to do (hiags Finally, the sentimentree market system, ratheroculisth* path to prosperity seems lo
Bantlatesh
Gratitude for Soviet support of1 turned to resentment of Moscow'i seeming ccfluiion wiih an arrogant and overbearing India, and Soviei-Bangladesh relations settled into a
A commonly heard expression in Bangladtth is lhat when It rains in Moscow, members of thePany af Hantladeih in Dhaka put up theirhis trnstmrnlairly accurateof the various Communist parties af ihese countries in lhat ihe USSR heavily Influences tkeir actions However, alt are riven by factionalism, and this, togetherervasive cultural and religious bias against Communist Ideology, serves to limit the ulariiy and Influence of the Communist parties.
Of all the Communist parties in the smallstates, the Communist Party af Bangladeshike largest,embershipUhmtgh prrty
leadership claims0 members. In Sri Lanka, ihe Communist partyember of ihe year-old United Socialist Alliance. Although Us members probably make up onlyoercent af Us total and are noi represented In the top leadership, ihe Communists exercise an influence over the Alliance oil ef proportion to their size because of ihe extensive backing they receive from Moscow Within the Sri Lankan insurgentrrai 4ml of lipservice is paid lo Marxism: however, ike overwhelminglon af groups such as the Janaiha Vtuklhiand Ikr Liberation Tigers of Tamilike moil Important and violent Sinhalese and Tamil groups,nationalism rather ikon Commumim. and we do not believe ike USSR pro-tides support to Hiker group.ember Communist Forty of Nepal ICPN) It severely split among ike pro-Moscow and ike Maoist and Trotsky lie factions. Probablyreaf tke pro-Soviet factions.
FoetlenaHsm is the dominant fact af life In the Cor.munlsi parties of these various countries, wiih almost any petty grievance or clash of personalities likely ia result In further splintering. Im. Ike pmrtirs have had increasing difficulty generating
exclusively by disaffected young Intellectualsby Ike poverty, rigid social system, andpolllles of tkeir societies. Tke British military atiacke at Kaihmandu believes Ikai ihe only reason tke CPN has any membership at all Is that,ountry where all political parlies are Illegal, tke orgamtat.on of ike CPS ond lis ability to function fusi ouislde the law attracts those whoehicle for iheir opposition to theolicies. He further lugsert! that, veftarties lega'.itid. the CPS would euickly disintegrate |
Never terribly important, the various Communis! parties are gradually losing whatever influence ikey da possess. But. as tkeir strength wanes. Soviei Influence in their operations Is growing. Moscow has longeady source of funding, using this largesse not onlyethod af controlling pro-Soviet factions but alsoeans of enticing other Marxist factions to loin the Soviet flock. Lately, as outside contributions to the ponies have declined. Soviet aid hasrtaler proportion ofbudgets In return. Moscow probably hopes to buy leverage with -hemupport In diplomatic efforts in the region, which will be best served ifest confrontational stance andower profile while building grassroots support outside the public spotlight]
wag chill. Sine* im. however, ihe relationship hit thawed nanbiy Dhaka had vcieiferously etpresscd distress about theasiei of Afghanistan, and it welcomed the withdrawal of forces Scmei financial tupporl for the Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB) and for the opposition Awami Lcaiuc ha*
recenlly declined, and,
loaco* cncournBod Ihe CPD io partici-
in6 parliamentarythat pleased Presidenl Ershad by aiding his efforts to build democracy in Bangladesh. Trade between ihe two countries has been slowly increasing, and Dhaka has agreed to bury tworansport planet to replace its agingoreover,ountry where anti-Indian and anti-Soviet sentiment is so strong ihal being labeled pro-Indian or pro-Soviet is tantamount to political death, tbe Bangladesh public has proved surprisingly responsive to Gorbachev's messages of arms conirol and denude* riraiion.
Nevertheless. Ihe chrook problem" of famine.rareptnt pcpulatiori growth, and attendantinsubtlay dictate Bangladesh's foreign policy Dhaka must concealrile on obtaining as much foreign aid as possible and maintaining sufficient inlemal stability to prevent Indian intervention, while uimj Chinese friendship lo balance New Delhi's influence. Western aid to Bangladesh makes upercent of lis loial foreign assistance, and further assistance from the West is channeled through multinationalThe USSR, wbxfc accounts for lessercent of Dhaka's foreign aid. could increase us contribution buthighly unlikely lo do to sufficiently to replace Western influence Indeed, when visitiag Dhaka in Mayoviet Depuiy Foreign Minister RogachcvppjHadmiited that, despite all thi public fanlareMMcow was making about Increasing aid io Soulh Asia, no grants would be fonheommg. only loans and expanded trade agreements Moreover. Bangladesh's strong Islamic culture breeds aauliputhy lo-ara Cacnmunism. severelyCPB popularity, and placing what amountseiling on the extent of Dhaka's ties to M<
laspaf
Like Bangladesh. Nepal also facet xnout problems of poverty and potentialthough not to the same eitent For Kaihmandu. however, the major factor affecting its reblioM with the USSR is aot aid, but its preeanous geopolitical position between China and India. Although the Himalayas actail bordering China, entry from India is relatively open, and Nepal's rivers run from the Himalayas inlo India. Geography has thus dictated that nearly all of Nepal's trade must move through India New Delhi can intervene easily in ibe kingdom should it choose to. while China woulduch more difficult urn* bringing its strength to bearJBBBBBJ
S li mm -Itb the dilemma of being beholden to those he considers his greatest eiternal threat. This fact dccninaies Nettles* loreign policy Kaihmandu was particularly disturbed by India's dispatch of troop* to Sri Lanka7 and the Maldives8 in response lo domestic unrest. It viewed these actions as marufestaiKWS of Indian expansionism, wbkhrecedeni unoomforlable for Nepal. King Birendra's solution for this predicument has been to reinforce friendship with China and to promote the idea of declaringone of Peace, someth.Bg be first prcooacdS. Tbe proposal finds link favor ia India, where itseen as an attempt io nullify the of0 treat
Until very recenlly. Nepal seemed to be th* exception that proved the rule of Soviet Soulh Asian foreign policy. Despite th* presence of Soviet troops inand harsh Nepalese criticism of the Soviet occupation, Nepalese officials had for some time expressed interest ia improving relaiioBi between Moscow and Kaihmandu. Utile progress was made because Kaihmandu demanded Soviei support for the
pjuckmuj Nepal Zone in Tcaccrcru4ui>ilcwanner relations, andrefused In deference to India.be S elhi's approval lo announceinatTney would consider ihe proposal and would encourage ihe support of certain of iheir East European allies. This gesture led to Soviel Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev* visit to Kaihrnandu inad it seemed to dear the way for the longvisits io Moscow py ihe King of Nepal and his Foreign Minister J
Since the beginningowever, events seem io have placed any further thaw in Soviet Nepalcie relations at leas! temporarily in suspense India was outraged to discover thatdH arms from China,
pBrsasaaasjIndian diplomats have moi the^peeiaTTtTa lions hip" between Nepal andt an end.esult. Moscow seems io have shelved hi i il
hi i
postpimed Nerulese Foreign Minister Upadhyaya'i trip to Moscow no as not to offend the Gandhi
Sri Uaka
Sri Laaka shares the disadvamages of Nepal andinstability,wrnome proximity lohas historically maintained very close ties io the United Slates and the Westounterweight to India. Colombo receives the vast majority of its aid from the West and strives to maintain Wealern interest in Sh Lanka, but this relationship can only slightly offset Indian pressure. President Premadasa is generally suspicious of India and the USSR and would prefer the United Stales as Sri Lanka'sut he is practical enough io recognize that geography dictates otherwise. Of even greater significance, Premadaia also rcahres he needs the continued support of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force to secure domestic stability, and he might be willing toeaplorc the possibility of replacing lost US aid with Soviel fu^diM
Sri Lanka is loo isolated, too far from the USSR, too peripheral to Soviel interests, and too central to Indian policy for the Soviets toelationship much distinct from thai with New Delhij
as India supported the TamilR likewise supponed opposition elements on the island; but, when India assumed the rote of mediator to the disputeid from Moscow abruptly ceased.ust before the Indian Intervention. Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Vceocttsov ensured ibe Gandhi government that it had the Soviet Union's unconditional support in SriThroughout the occupation, Moscow hai publkly followed New Delhi's line and bas given iheihai it considers Sri Lanka entirely India's
(hillock
Dhaka. Kaihrnandu, and Colombo all echo Moscow's desire to improve relations For this reason akme. some progress is likely to be made in ihe future. However. Ilie growth of Soriei influence will be limited because Moscow can afford to offer very lutle of what these countries want and becauie it will probably avoidigh profile in the smaller states that might jeopardize its standing with New Delhi. In recent years, strains have surfaced in the Irvdo-Soviei relationship, and the small South Asian stales are too irveonsefliremi'l lo Moscow io justifyisagreement that could furtherelationship so imporlant to Soviet foreign policy. The likely outcome is friendlier relations between Moscow and the smaller South Asian states, but no major breaklhrougl
Kut'u Hank
Original document.
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